Séminaire externe du LERN – Jeudi 26 novembre à 12h en Salle C3-19 (Campus Pasteur)
Jeudi 26 novembre 2026, nous aurons le plaisir d’écouter Marco Gazel (NEOMA Business School) qui présentera l’article « Governing the Energy Commons: Empirical Evidence on Sharing Rule Adoption » co-écrit avec Julien Jacqmin et Isac Olave-Cruz.
Abstract : Renewable production follows the weather, not consumption. Energy sharing initiatives jointly invest in and operate a renewable installation. The sharing rule they adopt allocates locally consumed electricity among members. Following Ostrom’s congruence principle, we treat this rule as a governance choice: it can align consumption with production, or leave the mismatch unaddressed. Using administrative data on the population of 199 Brussels energy sharing initiatives, we construct an ordinal measure of temporal incentive strength and identify its determinants. Larger initiatives adopt weaker-incentive rules, reflecting higher coordination costs. Those with greater installed capacity per member adopt stronger-incentive rules instead, reflecting larger material stakes. Communities that formalize into a legal entity within a single building are less likely to adopt a stronger-incentive rule than active customers relying on that building’s co-ownership structure, reflecting an equality-oriented rather than efficiency-oriented logic. This does not extend to communities that formalize across buildings, where no such structure exists. These findings reveal a scaling paradox: the conditions that let energy sharing grow, larger membership and formal governance, weaken its capacity to govern intermittency.

